Tuesday, January 22nd, 2008...6:20 pm

Linguistic wonkery at the Supreme Court!

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I’m not planning to talk about SCOTUS (that’s the Supreme Court Of The United States) much on this blog, in part because everybody else already does it. I’d be a mouse among giants. However, a post on the court’s decision in Ali v. Bureau of Prisons on California Appellate Report caught my eye because it combines two subjects near to my heart: appellate law and copy editing.

This is one of those decisions that turns on how the judges interpret vague language in the law. Ali is a prisoner whose prayer rug and Koran and some other religious stuff disappeared when he gave them to guards, during a move from one prison to another. He got annoyed and sued under the Federal Tort Claims Act, which allows lawsuits against the federal government when federal employees commit torts (basically, when they screw up in a way that’s illegal or really careless). Except that the Act gives an exception for property detained by “any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” Since prison guards are law enforcement officers, courts kept telling him he had no case. Today, the Supreme Court did the same thing with a 5-4 decision.

As I understand it, the majority says the law is straightforward: “any officer of the law” means any officer of the law. Period. You can’t sue cops for taking your stuff. The minority’s two dissents, which the Wall Street Journal Law Blog called “scorching”, say the wording is vague and should be interpreted with the context, using two heavy Latin legal phrases (ejusdem generis and noscitur a sociis) to support it. Then they say the majority is implicitly relying on a comma for its interpretation! Commas matter, guys. So do word choice and context, as the dissenters say at some length. Sloppy legal writing can land you (or the hapless beneficiaries of your laws) in court.

Justice Breyer had a particularly amusing way of explaining why he finds the word “any” too vague. For him, it’s not the meaning of the word that matters; it’s the scope of the word’s meaning. I can’t imagine that people who regularly read law blogs have missed this, but if you have, allow me to repeat it:

The word “any” is of no help because all speakers (including writers and legislators) who use general words such as “all,” “any,” “never,” and “none” normally rely upon context to indicate the limits of time and place within which they intend those words to do their linguistic work. And with the possible exception of the assertion of a universal truth, say by a mathematician, scientist, philosopher, or theologian, such limits almost always exist. When I call out to my wife, “There isn’t any butter,” I do not mean, “There isn’t any butter in town.” The context makes clear to her that I am talking about the contents of our refrigerator. That is to say, it is context, not a dictionary, that sets the boundaries of time, place, and circumstance within which words such as “any” will apply.

Love it! (Majoring in English will do that to a person.)

2 Comments

  • Can you highlight the full context of the law that includes the comma and would potentially make clearer any intent behind “any”? It sounds like Breyer thinks the scope of “any” as written is narrower than it is being used by the majority, which is surprising. I would guess the law would cast the scope of “any” to all law officers involved with the detention and confiscation and question, and not to, say, an out-of-town cop who stopped in to the evidence locker and grabbed a rug. From what I’ve read (which is basically this post and a quick perusal of the blog entry you refer to) it sounds like the officers in question would be well within the defined scope. So what’s Breyer’s beef? I ask these questions because I’m too lazy to read the dissent, the law, or the case.

  • From the very first paragraph of the decision we get this:
    “The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the United States’ sovereign immunity for claims arising out of torts committed by federal employees, see 28 U. S. C. §1346(b)(1), but, as relevant here, exempts from that waiver “[a]ny claim arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any . . . property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer,” §2680(c).”

    There could be something relevant and exciting hidden by the ellipse, but I doubt it.

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